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AN OVERVIEW OF CHAPTER 13-ITS USES AND
ABUSES
By Harold V. Dye*
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent economic conditions have brought far-reaching
changes to the practice of debtor representation. Individuals who
never considered taking bankruptcy have found themselves overex-
tended and, perhaps pressured by major creditors, have sought le-
gal counsel on how they could protect themselves.
Traditional legal thinking in many areas of the country, in-
cluding Montana, was that there were only two solutions to such
an individual's problem-an informal, non-judicial "work-out" and
straight bankruptcy. Notably ignored, most probably out of the at-
torney's lack of knowledge, was use of a Chapter XIII, renamed
Chapter 13 in the 1978 Act, repayment plan. Yet, in many cses,
Chapter 13 represents the best possible solution to the middle-
class debtor's problem. A well-designed Chapter 13 plan can give
the debtor a fresh start, preserve many assets and salvage much of
a credit rating as well. At the same time, unlike a non-judicial
work-out, Chapter 13 does not depend upon creditor cooperation
for its successful implementation. Thus, the twin obstacles to suc-
cessful non-judicial debtor rehabilitation-excessive squeezing by
creditors and intercreditor jockeying for better position-are elimi-
nated. In addition, the unique features of Chapter 13, including
more extensive discharge and the ability to cure defaults, reject
burdensome executory contracts and redeem secured collateral
over time, combine to make it the vehicle of choice in dealing with
a middle-class debtor's financial problems.'
This article will explore the procedure used in Chapter 13
cases and show how it may be used in the client's best advantage.
It is written primarily from the perspective of a debtor's attorney.
The areas of potential abuse of Chapter 13 will be touched on for
the benefit of creditors' counsel.
* Shareholder in the law firm of Milodragovich, Dale & Dye, P.C., Missoula, Montana;
B.S., University of Montana, 1968; J.D. with honors, University of Montana School of Law,
1971.
1. Obviously, a non-judicial work-out is the best solution to a debtor's financial
problems if practicable. However, by the time many debtors consult counsel, most have
tried and failed at solving financial problems by non-judicial means.
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A. Background-History of Former Chapter XIII
Chapter XIII was originally enacted as part of the mid-depres-
sion reform of the bankruptcy laws in 1938.1 Its purpose, according
to its sponsor, was to protect "persons who are employed for wages
or salaries and who, without being adjudicated bankrupt, wish to
pay their debts under the protection of a federal court, free from
garnishments, executions, attachments, penalties, usury or exces-
sive costs."3
When Chapter XIII was enacted, section 74 of the Bankruptcy
Act authorizing compositions was in force as were many state com-
position statutes. Chapter XIII was enacted as a "small claims"
procedure directed specifically at debt relief for the wage earner.
Indeed, originally, Chapter XIII was not only limited to persons
whose "principal income is derived from wages, salaries or commis-
sions, "4 but was further limited to persons whose total income did
"not exceed $3,600 per year.' '" Later the income limitations were
removed but Chapter XIII remained limited to employees.
The success of Chapter XIII varied widely from district to dis-
trict. This was in large part due to differing attitudes on the part
of judges, trustees and practitioners as to whether Chapter XIII
was a workable debt adjustment device or merely a time-consum-
ing prelude to straight bankruptcy.7
B. The Bankruptcy Reform Act
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19788 made radical revisions
to the former Chapter XIII, renamed Chapter 13. These changes
were made with an express Congressional intent to encourage use
of Chapter 13 as an alternative to straight bankruptcy.' The provi-
sions of Chapter 13 were expanded, simplified and made more flex-
2. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 696, 52 Stat. 840, 930 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Chan-
dler Act]. Chapter XIII is codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 1001-86 (1976).
3. Chandler, The Wage Earner's Plan: Its Purpose, 15 VAND. L. REv. 169, 170 (1961).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1006(8) (1976) (Bankruptcy Act § 606(8)).
5. Chandler Act, supra note 2, at 931.
6. McDuffee, The Wage Earner's Plan In Practice, 15 VAND. L. REV. 173 (1961).
7. Id. at 176.
8. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (enacting Title 11, United States Code).
This enactment will be referred to throughout this article as the "Bankruptcy Code" or the
"Code." The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, will be the "Bankruptcy Act" or the
"Act." The Act's wage earner adjustment provision was Chapter XIII while the Code's pro-
visions for adjustment of debts of persons with regular income is Chapter 13. All section
references in text and citation in footnotes are to 11 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1979) unless other-
wise indicated.
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6078 [hereinafter cited as House Report].
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ible. 10 Many of the "provisions in the current bankruptcy law that
enable private action to undo the beneficial effects of bankruptcy"
were eliminated."
While the essential concept of payment out of future income
was retained, eligibility for relief under Chapter 13 was expanded
from wage earners to any "individual with regular income." An in-
dividual with regular income is somewhat circuitously defined as
an "individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to
enable such individual to make planned payments under a plan
under Chapter 13 of this title, other than a stock broker or a com-
modity broker. 1 2 Eligibility for Chapter 13 is restricted to persons
with less than $100,000 in non-contingent, liquidated, unsecured
debts and $350,000 in non-contingent, liquidated, secured debts."
The use of composition plans-as opposed to extension
plans-was encouraged by eliminating the requirement for un-
secured creditors' consent to a plan" and by requiring that a plan
must be completed within three years.15 Congress also adopted nu-
merous provisions to increase the use of Chapter 13 plans, includ-
ing expanded dischargability vis-a-vis straight bankruptcy, 6 pro-
tection of co-debtors,17 the ability to redeem secured collateral over
time,' and the ability to cure defaults.19
Congress greatly enlarged the "carrot" of Chapter 13 by mak-
ing it substantially more debtor-oriented, while Congress refrained
)from creating an involuntary Chapter 13. Chapter 13 remains as
Chapter XIII was before it, an entirely voluntary proceeding.20
Only a debtor may file under Chapter 13,1 and a Chapter 7 (liqui-
dation) or Chapter 11 (reorganization) proceeding may be con-
10. Id. at 117-18.
11. Id. at 117.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 101(24).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). Section 652 of the Act (former 11 U.S.C. § 1062) required
the consent of a majority in number and amount of unsecured creditors affected by a plan.
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c). A court may "for cause" approve a plan lasting no longer than
five years either as originally proposed or as modified. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(c), 1329(c). These
limitations were imposed because of Congress' finding that excessively long repayment plans
did not provide debtors with the relief and fresh start that are "the essence of modern
bankruptcy law," and therefore, the plans were the closest thing in modern America to in-
dentured servitude. House Report, supra note 9, at 117.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 1301.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
19. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
20. Congress was concerned that an involuntary Chapter 13 would violate the Thir-
teenth Amendment and be "debt peonage." House Report, supra note 9, at 120-21.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a).
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verted to Chapter 13 only with the consent of the debtor.2 2 The
Chapter 13 debtor has the absolute right to convert to a Chapter 7
liquidation at any time,"8 and only the debtor may propose a
Chapter 13 plan. "
Il. PROCEDURE UNDER CHAPTER 13
As with any voluntary bankruptcy matter, a Chapter 13 case is
commenced by filing a petition with the bankruptcy court." Filing
the petition constitutes an order for relief,26 imposes an automatic
stay on any action against the debtor or the debtor's property,7
and invests the bankruptcy court with exclusive jurisdiction over
this property.2' A statement of affairs should be filed with the peti-
tion, but on application the time may be extended. 9 At present,
the statement may be filed on Official Form 13-5 developed for use
in Chapter XIII, supplemented by a statement of property claimed
exempt s and, in the case of a debtor engaged in business, by a
statement of financial affairs."'
A Chapter 13 plan must be filed with the petition or within 10
days thereafter.32 The court may grant an extension "for cause
shown and on such notice to such persons as the court may di-
rect."38 The plan may be filed on Official Form 13-6. Form 13-6,
however, was developed for use under Chapter XIII and does not
have a format for many of the provisions allowed by Chapter 13,
such as classification of claims, curing of defaults, and modification
of the rights of secured parties. Preparation of a custom-drafted
plan, therefore, should always be considered. In complex cases,
22. 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(c), 1112(d).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 1321; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 141 reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5927 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report).
25. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302. Venue requirements are found at 28 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp.
III 1979).
26. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 362.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (Supp. III 1979).
29. RULE 13-107, RULES OF BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURE, 11 U.S.C. app. (1976) [hereinafter
cited as BANKRUPTCY RULES]. The statement may be filed up to 10 days after the petition,
and the court may grant an additional extension of up to 10 days. A further extension can
be only granted "for cause shown and on such notice as the court may direct."
30. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BANKRUPTCY RULES, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, SUGGESTED INTERIM BANKRUPTCY RULES, Rule 13001(a) (West 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Interim Rules]. The statement of exempt property should be on Schedule 4, In-
terim Form No. 6.
31. Interim Rules, Rule 13001(b). Interim Bankruptcy Form No. 8 should be used.
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forms used in reorganization cases should be consulted.
Copies of the debtor's plan are sent to creditors with a notice
of first meeting of creditors. Under Bankruptcy Rule 13-202, a
creditor must file a written rejection of a plan "prior to the conclu-
sion of the first meeting of creditors" or the creditor is "deemed to
have accepted such plan." Rule 13-202 was developed under Chap-
ter XIII, where the first meeting of creditors was combined with a
hearing on confirmation of the plan presided over by the bank-
ruptcy judge. It was necessary for the judge to know at the time of
the hearing whether the requisite number of acceptances had been
received so that the judge could decide whether the plan could be
confirmed. The rule is somewhat anomolous under the Code, since
now a first meeting of creditors is no more than an opportunity to
examine the debtor, and because a separate confirmation hearing is
held before the judge. Nevertheless, the rule is "not inconsistent
with" the Code and, therefore, remains in effect.34
Rule 13-202 is irrelevant to unsecured creditors since the Code
no longer requires acceptance of unsecured creditors for confirma-
tion of a plan."5 The rule can be a trap, however, for the unwary
secured creditor. The Code allows a Chapter 13 plan to modify the
rights of secured creditors." A secured creditor not timely rejecting
a proposed plan may be deemed to have accepted the plan and be
without standing to object to it at the confirmation hearing. In-
deed, the creditor may not be able to challenge the debtor's treat-
ment of the creditor at all-as long as the debtor's treatment is in
conformity with the plan. This problem is compounded by the fact
that the first meeting of creditors is usually held on short notice"7
and counsel usually does not become involved until later, when it
may be too late. It is, therefore, prudent for creditors' counsel to
advise clients always to consult with counsel on any Chapter 13
plan as soon as it is received. Failing that, creditors' counsel should
advise universal rejection of Chapter 13 plans since that result can
be more easily undone than the deemed acceptance of an unsatis-
factory plan.
Following the first meeting of creditors, a confirmation hearing
is held before the bankruptcy judge.3 While the standards for con-
firmation will be discussed in more detail below, it should be noted
34. Bankruptcy Reform Act, supra note 8, § 405(d).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
37. BANKRUPTCY RULE 13-203 requires a minimum of 10 days notice.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 1324. Under the Code, the bankruptcy judge does not preside over
meetings of creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 341(c).
1982]
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here that confirmation involves judgmental concepts such as "good
faith"3 9 and questions of valuation, which must be decided by the
judge on the basis of evidence presented. The hearing must there-
fore be regarded as an adversarial one by both creditor's and
debtor's counsel. That is, a mere argument or objection will seldom
prevail in the face of contrary evidence and, as in most litigation,
the cause usually goes to the most prepared.
The importance of a Chapter 13 creditor actively protecting
his rights is illustrated by the statutory effect of confirmation. 0
Each creditor is bound by the provisions of a confirmed plan
"whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the
plan," and notwithstanding whether the creditor has rejected or
objected to the plan.41 In addition, unless otherwise provided in
the plan or the order of confirmation, confirmation "vests all the
property of the estate in the debtor. . . free and clear of any claim
or interest of any creditor provided for by the plan. '42  '
This may be best illustrated by an example. Assume that a
bank is owed $10,000 secured by the debtor's four-wheel drive
pickup, other vehicles, a collection of antique firearms and a collec-
tion of gold coins, which have a conservative wholesale market val-
uation of $30,000. The debtor proposes that the four-wheel drive
pickup be surrendered to the bank in satisfaction of the debt and
presents evidence at the confirmation hearing from a used car
dealer that the four-wheel drive pickup is worth $10,000. Confir-
mation of the plan discharges the bank's debt. It would also release
the bank's other security even though it turned out that, due to
the depressed market for four-wheel drive vehicles, the bank only
received $5,000 for the pickup. 8
A. The Role of the Trustee in Chapter 13 Cases
In revising Chapter 13, Congress superimposed a number of
concepts from business reorganizations on the former structure of
wage-earner's plans. Like a Chapter 11 business reorganization, the
Chapter 13 debtor'remains in possession. 4 -However, unlike Chap-
ter 11, 4 5 a trustee is appointed in every Chapter 13 case.46 Unlike a
39. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
40. 11 U.S.C. § 1327.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a).
42. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1327(b), (c).
43. It is important to reiterate that under BANKRUPTCY RULE 13-202, the same result
follows if the bank fails to file a written rejection of the plan prior to the conclusion of the
first meeting of creditors.
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1107. A trustee can be appointed in a Chapter 11 case under 11 U.S.C.
[Vol. 43
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Chapter 7 liquidation,7 creditors lack the power to elect a Chapter
13 trustee." Congress intended to encourage a system of private,
standing Chapter 13 trustees who would not be "mere disbursing
agents" but would provide financial counseling and "assist the
debtor in the performance of the plan . . . ." Just how well this
has worked out in practice is debatable. There is some indication
that the limitation on trustee compensation in section 1302(e),
coupled with the fact that private standing trustees are not subsi-
dized, makes it financially difficult for Chapter 13 trustees to act as
"mere disbursing agents" much less provide a variety of free debt
counseling services to the public.5 0
Be that as it may, the duties of a liquidation trustee are di-
vided between the debtor and the trustee in Chapter 13 cases. The
Chapter 13 debtor has, to the exclusion of the trustee,51 the power
to sell and lease property of the estate, including the power to sell
free and clear of liens.5 1 On the other hand, the Chapter 13 trustee
is given the liquidation trustee's powers and duties of investiga-
tion, objection to claims and objection to discharge.5 3
As a practical matter, however, a Chapter 13 trustee has
neither possession of the property of the estate nor an obligation to
liquidate the estate for the benefit of creditors. Consequently, the
trustee would presumably not be interested in avoiding preferences,
under section 547" or fraudulent transfers under section 548. In-
deed, using Chapter 13 as a device to mask preferences or fraudu-
lent transfers is one potential abuse of the Chapter 13 process.
Of course, when a Chapter 13 case is converted to liquidation,
the trustee then has the ability to pursue preferences or fraudulent
transfers since a converted case relates back to the original filing
date of the petition. 5 There is a danger, though, that the issue
would never arise because the Chapter 13 statement of affairs does
not ask questions about transfers of property or repayment of
§ 1104 but this is not the norm.
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 702.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
49. Senate Report, supra note 24, at 139.
50. See In re lacovoni, 1 C.B.C. 2d 331, 348 (B.C. D. Utah 1979)(where the court de-
nied confirmation of zero and nominal payment plans in part because insufficient monies
would be generated to pay the trustee).
51. 11 U.S.C. § 1303.
52. 11 U.S.C. § 363. Note that the debtor's sale of property of the estate is also subject
to the safeguards of this section.
53. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1302(b), 707.
54. 11 U.S.C. § 547.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 348.
1982]
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The heart of Chapter 13 lies in sections 1322 and 1325. Section
1322(a) lists the mandatory plan elements; section 1322(b) lists the
permissive elements of a plan. Sectinn 1325 states the rqen,;
ments for confirmation. When section 1325 is read with section
1322(a), a checklist of nine minimum elements for confirmation is
derived. These elements are: (1) future income must be submitted
to the trustee for the payment of debts;"7 (2) priority claims must
be paid in full;" (3) like treatment must be provided for claims
within the same class;59 (4) the filing fee must be paid;"e (5) the
plan must have been "proposed in good faith and not by any
means forbidden by law"; 1 (6) unsecured creditors must receive at
least as much as they would on liquidation;'2 (7) secured creditors
must accept the plan, receive back their security or the plan must
satisfy the cramdown requirements of the Code;" (8) the plan
must be feasible;"' and (9) the plan may last no longer than three
years."
If a plan meets these standards, the court is required to con-
firm it," although, as will be seen, the underlying concept of good
faith gives the bankruptcy court ample discretion.
C. Good Faith as an Element of Confirmation
Of the above standards, the one that is the most central to the
Chapter 13 debt adjustment process is the requirement that a plan
be "proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by
law." 61 Through this standard Congress intended to inject needed
flexibility into the individual debt adjustment process, while at the
same time protecting against abuse resulting from that flexibility.
56. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2). Priority claims are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 507 and are, in
general: administrative expenses; wages and fringe benefits accrued within 90 and 180 days
of filing, respectively; deposits for household items; and taxes and custom duties.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2).
61. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c). The court may allow a plan for up to a total of five years "for
cause."
66. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). House Report, supra note 9, at 430.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3).
[Vol. 43
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The concept of good faith is not a new one to bankruptcy law and
virtually identical language was used in several sections of the
Bankruptcy Act. A substantial body of case law has developed on
what is or is not good faith in various circumstances. 5
For example, Chapter 13 has eliminated the requirement of
Chapter XIII that unsecured creditors approve a plan and instead
has substituted the "best interest of creditors" test. The test re-
quires that unsecured creditors will receive "not less than the
amount that would be paid on such claim if the estate of the
debtor were liquidated. . . ."9 This means that in a no-asset liq-
uidation case-that is, where the debtor has no assets over and
above exempt property-a Chapter 13 plan involving no distribu-
tion to unsecured creditors could be confirmed. Likewise, the mini-
mum payment acceptable for confirmation of a plan is the excess
value of the debtor's property over the value of exempt property.
While the best interest of creditors test obviously makes
Chapter 13 more flexible, it also opens up possibilities for abuse.
This is so principally because the test makes no reference to the
debtor's earnings or ability to pay. Also the hypothetical compari-
son to a liquidation involves assigning liquidation values to the
debtor's assets which are usually substantially less than either ac-
quisition or replacement costs. This potential for abuse is com-
pounded by the provision that a debtor's property vests in the
debtor upon confirmation of the plan and not upon consummation
of the plan,70 and that a discharge under Chapter 13 allows a dis-
charge of many otherwise non-dischargeable debts.71
Coupled with the apparent vagueness of the good faith stan-
dard, this potential for abuse has led to a wide array of decisions
on when a Chapter 13 plan is filed "in good faith" and therefore
may be confirmed. Some courts have held, by analogy to section
727(a)(9), 7 2 that a plan must propose at least 70 percent payment
68. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1274, 1277(b). A detailed analysis of the good faith require-
ments of the various sections and chapters of the Bankruptcy Act and their effect on Chap-
ter 13 of the Code is outside the scope of this article. For an excellent outline on the good
faith standard under the Act with a discussion of leading cases, see Ordin, Good Faith in
the Bankruptcy Court, in BANKR. LGATION INST.: STRATEGY FOR THE NEW LAW (1981)
(Law & Business, Inc.).
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(9). Essentially this section states that a Chapter 13 discharge
prevents a discharge in a Chapter 7 case commenced within six years after the date of filing
of a Chapter 13 petition, unless all unsecured creditors were paid in full or payments to
unsecured creditors total 70 percent and "the plan was proposed by the debtor in good faith
and was the debtor's best effort."
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to unsecured claims to be eligible for confirmation.73 On the other
hand, other courts routinely confirm zero payment plans on the
holding that nothing beyond the "best interests of creditors" test
needs to be satisfied for confirmation. 4 Courts have divided on
whether a plan, to be proposed in good faith, must be the debtor's
beqt effort75 and whether the debtor's fraud, such as procuring
credit by false financial statements, bars confirmation." To further
complicate the matter, legislative history of this section is less than
enlightening on what Congress intended by good faith."
Obviously, reconciliation of the cases on the issue of good faith
is not possible. Nevertheless, it is possible to find certain indica-
tions of what Congress meant and therefore determine the type of
plan that may be confirmed. The first point is almost self-evident.
In using such an elastic term as good faith Congress clearly in-
tended to adopt a flexible standard that would be applied on a case
by case basis. Accordingly, cases that adopt mechanical, per se
rules for confirmation, such as In re Burrell" (70 percent distribu-
tion to unsecured creditors required) and In re Sadler" (no distri-
bution to unsecured creditors beyond best interest required), are
clearly in error.
Secondly, Congress intended Chapter 13 to be something
other than the liquidation under Chapter 7. A Chapter 13 plan
that is essentially equivalent to a liquidation should not be con-
firmed. 0 Plans proposing nominal or no payments to unsecured
creditors are suspect. Such plans should be closely scrutinized to
determine whether, from the point of view of benefit to creditors
or rehabilitation of the debtor, there is any substantive distinction
between the plan and liquidation. This does not mean that a zero
or nominal payment plan can never be confirmed. Rather the
debtor bears a greater burden of showing why the plan is proposed
in good faith and is not in reality a disguised liquidation. An exam-
ple of a clearly correct decision confirming nominal payment plans
is In re Dills,s1 in which the debtor previously paid 50 percent to
73. In re Burrell, 1 C.B.C. 2d 474 (B.C. N.D. Cal. 1980), rev'd 6 B.R. 360, 2 C.B.C. 2d
1019 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
74. In re Sadler, 1 C.B.C. 2d 935 (B.C. E.D. Ark. 1980).
75. Compare In re Burrell, 6 B.R. 360, 2 C.B.C. 2d 1019 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (best efforts
not required) with In re Murallo, 4 B.R. 666 (B.C. D. Conn. 1980) (best efforts required).
76. Compare In re Tanke, 4 B.R. 339, 2 C.B.C. 2d 240 (B.C. D. Colo. 1980) with In re
Keckler, 3 B.R. 155 (B.C. N.D. Ohio 1980).
77. See Senate Report, supra note 24, at 142; House Report, supra note 9, at 430.
78. In re Burrell, 1 C.B.C. 2d 474 (B.C. N.D. Cal. 1980).
79.- In re Sadler, 1 C.B.C. 2d 935 (B.C. E.D. Ark. 1980).
80. In re Campbell, 3 B.R. 57 (B.C. S.D. Cal. 1980).
81. 7 B.R. 160 (B.C. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
[Vol. 43
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the same unsecured creditors in a Chapter XIII plan that lasted
nine years. Another example is In re Bellgraph82 where a disabled
debtor whose sole income was from child support, social security
and public assistance was attempting to save her home from fore-
closure by paying off a secured creditor and taxes over a five-year
period. This effort the court judge termed "a super effort to pay
her debts."83
Third, while most courts require more than mere subjective
good faith in order to confirm a Chapter 13 plan," a finding of
subjective bad faith will always lead to denial of confirmation. 8 So
will plans that are found to be an abuse of Chapter 13.86 The diffi-
culty is that some courts have considered it an abuse for debtors to
take advantage of provisions inserted in the Code for their
benefit.87
Fourth, bankruptcy courts have considered it relevant whether
the debtor is attempting to discharge through Chapter 13 indebt-
edness that would be non-dischargeable under Chapter 7 ." If such
debt is present, courts are not at all reluctant to make the debtor
pay a greater price for discharge.8 9 Conversely, the lack of non-dis-
chargeable debt is a factor in inducing some courts to confirm min-
imal payment plans on the reasoning that unsecured creditors have
little to complain of, since they would receive nothing on
liquidation.'0
In summary, and although the cases are not in agreement, the
courts are moving towards a five-part balancing test in determining
whether a plan is proposed in good faith. Factors to be considered
are:
(1) The percentage to be paid to unsecured creditors under thb
82. 4 B.R. 421, 2 C.B.C. 2d 1057 (B.C. W.D. N.Y. 1980).
83. Id. at 424.
84. In re Barnes, 5 B.R. 376 (B.C. D. D.C. 1980).
85. In re Cole, 3 B.R. 346 (B.C. S.D. W. Va. 1980) (zero payment to only creditor of
significant amount who had a non-dischargeable tort judgment totaling three-quarters of
debtor's annual income); In re Lockwood, 5 B.R. 294, 2 C.B.C. 2d 781 (B.C. S.D. Fla. 1980)
(plan proposed by debtor's attorney who would make a profit of several thousanddollars on
purchase of debtor's house that was worth more than debt against it).
86. In re Lockwood, 5 B.R. at 298, 2 C.B.C. 2d at 785.
87. E.g., In re Johnson, 5 B.R. 40 (B.C. S.D. Ohio 1980) (confirmation denied in plan
lasting "only" 42 months). Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c).
88. In re Marlow, 3 B.R. 305 (B.C. N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Bloom, 3 B.R. 467, 3 C.B.C.
2d 1098 (B.C. C.D. Cal. 1980); In re Cook, 3 B.R. 480 (B.C. S.D. W. Va. 1980); In re
Murallo, 4 B.R. 666 (B.C. D. Conn. 1980).
89. In re Yee, 7 B.R. 747, 3 C.B.C. 2d 388 (B.C. E.D. N.Y. 1980) (non-dischargeable
student loan).
90. In re Clouthier, 7 B.R. 784, 1 C.B.C. 2d 909 (B.C. D. Colo. 1980).
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plan;91
(2) Presence or absence of debts non-dischargeable under
Chapter 7;
(3) The debtor's income and budget-that is, how close the
plan comes to the debtor's best effort;
I Al M 1l h f +ko pland2 n1l
(5) A catch-all category considering the totality of the circum-
stances, including classification of claims, redemption of secured
collateral and previous bankruptcy. The test is whether it appears
that the debtor has attempted to make a reasonable effort to be
fair with creditors, or intends to abuse the spirit and purpose of
Chapter 13."a
D. Discharge
Once confirmed, a plan binds the debtor and all creditors
"whether or not the claim of such creditor is provided for by the
plan, and whether or not the creditor has objected to, has ac-
cepted, or has rejected the plan."' Confirmation also vests all
property of the estate in the debtor free and clear of claims of
creditors except as provided in the plan. 5 Normally payments
under the plan are made to the standing trustee.'6 In an appropri-
ate case, however, such as one involving a business debtor, the
court may allow the debtor or a third person to be the disbursing
agent. 7 To expedite payment, the court may order the debtor's
employer to pay the trustee directly. 8
A debtor who has completed all payments provided for under
the confirmed plan is entitled to a discharge under section 1328(a).
This discharge is a unique facet of Chapter 13 since it discharges
all debts except long term indebtedness,99 alimony and child sup-
91. No case denied confirmation where the plan proposed to pay unsecured creditors
50 percent or more of their debts. See, e.g., In re Powell, 1 C.B.C. 2d 371 (B.C. E.D. Va.
1980) (50 percent); In re Pearson, 4 B.R. 376, 2 C.B.C. 2d 290 (B.C. N.D. Ohio 1980) (70
percent).
92. Unless a substantial percentage is paid to unsecured creditors, courts tend to ex-
pect the plan to approach the statutory maximum of three years. See, e.g., In re Henry, 7
B.R. 826 (B.C. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (four months); In re Anderson, 3 B.R. 160, 2 C.B.C. 2d 594
(B.C. S.D. Cal. 1980) (15 months); In re White, 4 B.R. 349, 2 C.B.C. 2d 224 (B.C. E.D. Va.
1980) (27 months).
93. In re Schongalla, 4 B.R. 360, 2 C.B.C. 2d 286 (B.C. D. Md. 1980).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a).
95. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1327(b), (c).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1326(b).
97. Id.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b); BANKRUPTCY RULE 13-213(b).
99. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
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port 00 and taxes entitled to priority.101 All other debts made non-
dischargeable under section 523 are discharged by a section
1328(a) discharge and include debts incurred through false pre-
tenses or false financial statements,102 unscheduled debts,10 3 debts
resulting from fraud, embezzlement or larceny,1 0' damages from
willful and malicious injury to the person or property of another,105
fines, penalties and forfeitures,'" educational loans'07 and debts as
to which discharge was denied or waived in prior bankruptcy
cases.108
Obviously the mere recital of the types of debts dischargeable
under section 1328(a) conjures up visions of perpetrators of fraud-
ulent and criminal conduct escaping liability through nominal pay-
ments under a Chapter 13 plan. Nevertheless, the purpose of Con-
gress in allowing expanded dischargeability through a successfully
completed Chapter 13 plan was its belief that even in cases involv-
ing normally non-dischargeable debt, there should be an opportu-
nity for financial rehabilitation and a fresh start. Also, the courts
uniformly hold that plans that propose only nominal payments to
victims of fraudulent or criminal conduct are not filed in good
faith.109
Section 1328(b) provides for a hardship discharge to a debtor
not completing a plan if three conditions are met:
(1) [T~he debtor's failure to complete such payments is due to
circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held
accountable;
(2)[T]he value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property
actually distributed under the plan on account of each allowed
100. 11 U.S.C § 523(a)(5).
101. Technically, taxes entitled to priority are not an exception to a section 1328(a)
discharge. Section 1322(a)(2), however, requires that a Chapter 13 plan must provide for full
payment for claims entitled to priority under section 507, which includes tax claims entitled
to priority.
102. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). Allowing unscheduled debts to be discharged via Chapter
13 presents an interesting due process problem since such creditors are given neither notice
nor an opportunity to be heard concerning the Chapter 13 case. If the debtor deliberately
omits a creditor from Chapter 13 schedules, some limited relief is available through section
1328(e), which allows revocation of a Chapter 13 discharge for one year after the discharge is
granted, if the discharge was obtained through fraud and if knowledge of the fraud came to
the requesting party after granting of the discharge.
104. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8).
108. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9).
109. See, e.g., In re Frederickson, 5 B.R. 199 (B.C. M.D. Fla. 1980).
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unsecured claim is not less than the amount that would have been
on such claim if the estate of the debtor had been liquidated
under Chapter 7 of this title on such date; and
(3)[M]odification of the plan under section 1329 of this title is not
practicable. 110
A section 1328(b) discharge, unlike one under section 1328(a),
is coextensive with a discharge granted in a Chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding. It is subject to all the exceptions to discharge provided
in section 523.111 Consequently, debtor's counsel whose client has
potential dischargeability pfoblems, is well advised to propose a
realistic plan in the first instance. Then, if the debtor is unable to
complete payments under that plan, application may be made for a
modification of the plan under section 1329,112 for example, to ex-
tend the term or reduce the payments, rather than applying for a
hardship discharge.
While section 1329(b) purports to grant the court considerable
discretion in granting a hardship discharge or requiring the debtor
to continue with the plan, in fact, that discretion can be easily cir-
cumvented by converting the case to a liquidation. Section 1307(a)
grants the debtor the absolute right to convert a Chapter 13 case
to a liquidation "at any time."'11 3 If the case would have been a no-
asset case under Chapter 7, or if the debtor's payments to un-
secured creditors under the plan, plus non-exempt assets remain-
ing at conversion, equal what creditors would have received if the
case had originally been filed under a liquidation, then the debtor's
discharge under section 727 should follow as a matter of course. If,
however, during the course of the plan, the debtor has dissipated
assets that would have been available for unsecured creditors, then
discharge may be denied under section 727(a)(2).11 This section
requires the trustee to prove that the diversion of estate property
was "with intent to hinder, delay or defraud" and therefore would
exclude unintended or merely negligent transfers of assets by the
Chapter 13 debtor.
110. Section 1329 provides that a plan can be modified anytime after confirmation,
but prior to completion of payments, to increase or decrease either the amount of payments
or the length of the plan. The modified plan must generally meet the standards as an origi-
nal plan for confirmation except that a confirmation hearing, as such, does not need to be
held; only notice and hearing-that is, notice to the affected creditors and an opportunity to
request a hearing. See 11 U.S.C. § 102(1).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 1329.
113. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a).
114. If the debtor is unable to "explain satisfactorily" what became of the estate prop-
erty, discharge may also be denied under section 727(5).
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III. SPECIAL FEATURES OF CHAPTER 13 PROCEEDINGS
A stated goal of Congress in enacting Chapter 13 was to make
its provisions "more flexible." 1 5 This increase in flexibility has re-
sulted in a smorgasbord of features useful to the financially dis-
tressed debtor. A summary of these provisions and their potential
uses follows.
A. Protection of Co-debtor
Section 1301 provides for extension of the automatic stay to
co-debtors in Chapter 13 cases." 6 The stay is limited to "consumer
debts,"' 17 which are debts incurred primarily for personal, family
or household purposes, where the co-debtor is an individual (a nat-
ural person) who becomes a co-debtor other than in the ordinary
course of business. The stay imposed by section 1301, therefore, by
its terms, does not extend to such situations as guaranteed busi-
ness debts, corporate sureties or recourse liability on sales
contracts.
In addition, a creditor may, through an adversary proceed-
ing," 8 obtain relief from the stay "to the extent that" the co-
debtor received consideration from the creditor or the debtor pro-
poses not to pay the debt under the plan, or the creditor would be
irreparably injured."'
Section 1301 is a narrowly drafted statute designed to protect
accommodation co-debtors of consumer debts-normally friends or
relatives. Congress viewed pressure on such co-debtors which re-
sulted in straight bankruptcy and reaffirmation as a major obstacle
to the use of Chapter XIII under the Act. 20 In decisions under the
Code, bankruptcy courts have not hesitated to lift the section 1301
stay to the extent that the creditor is not to be paid under the
plan,' 2 ' but have been reluctant to lift the stay totally on a credi-
tor's claim of irreparable injury.12 2
115. House Report, supra note 9, at 117-18.
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1301.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 101(7).
118. In re Willis, 2 B.R. 63 (B.C. W.D. Va. 1980).
119. 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c).
120. House Report, supra note 9, at 426.
121. See, e.g., In re Willis, 2 B.R. 63 (B.C. W.D. Va. 1980).
122. See, e.g., In re Burton, 4 B.R. 608, 2 C.B.C. 2d 577 (B.C. N.D. Va. 1980) (where
the court held the creditor to the common law burden of proving irreparable injury and
ruled that the creditor failed in this burden by failing to show evidence that the credit
atanding of the co-debtor had changed).
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B. Classification of Claims
Section 1322(b)(1) allows a plan to classify unsecured
claims. 123 This is in contrast to the Act which required a plan to
deal "with unsecured debts generally, upon any terms. 1 " There
are several major limitations on the debtor's right to classify. First,
claims within a class must be "substantiWly sii.ar ;1 +1% " .
claims or interests of such class. 12 5 Secondly, the same treatment
must be provided for each claim within a particular class. 2' Third,
the debtor may not "discriminate unfairly" among classes. 11
Most litigation on claim classification under the Code is cen-
tered around the debtor's attempt to prefer cosigned obligations.
The majority of courts have held that such classification is not per-
mitted.1 28 Courts have uniformly held that alimony and child sup-
port may be separately classified and preferred1 29 and have allowed
classification favoring medical bills, 30 business debts s and rent.1 32
Separate classification favoring holders of bad checks has been
denied."13
C. Installment Redemptions and Curing of Defaults
In a straight bankruptcy under Chapter 7, the debtor pos-
sesses a limited right to redeem collateral under section 722 by
paying the creditor its value. The redemption right under section
722 is limited by its terms to. "tangible personal property intended
primarily for personal, family, or household use . . . ." By the
clear majority of decisions, redemption under section 722 must be
by a lump sum cash payment.'"
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).
124. 11 U.S.C. § 1046(1) (1976) (Bankruptcy Act § 646(1)).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 1122 (incorporated by reference into 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(1)). An ex-
ception to this requirement is the debtor's ability to designate a class of small claims for
prior payment for administrative convenience under section 1122(b).
126. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(3).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1).
128. Classification permitted: In re Kovich, 4 B.R. 403, 2 C.B.C. 2d 203 (B.C. W.D.
Mich. 1980). Classification denied: In re McKenzie, 4 B.R. 88 (B.C. W.D. N.Y. 1980); In re
Montano, 4 B.R. 535, 2 C.B.C. 2d 431 (B.C. D. D.C. 1980); In re Nichols, 4 B.R. 481 (B.C.
S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Crago, 4 B.R. 483 (B.C. S.D. Ohio 1980); In re Iacovoni, 1 C.B.C. 2d
331 (B.C. D. Utah 1979).
129. In re Curtis, 2 B.R. 43 (B.C. W.D. Mo. 1979); In re Haag, 3 B.R. 649, 2 C.B.C. 2d
144 (B.C. D. Or. 1980).
130. In re Sutherland, 3 B.R. 420 (B.C. W.D. Ark. 1980); In re Kovich, 4 B.R. 403, 2
C.B.C. 2d 203 (B.C. W.D. Mich. 1980).
131. In re Sutherland, 3 B.R. 420 (B.C. W.D. Ark. 1980).
132. In re Kovich, 4 B.R. 403, 2 C.B.C. 2d 203 (B.C. W.D. Mich. 1980).
133. In re Gay, 3 B.R. 336 (B.C. D. Colo. 1980).
134. See, e.g., In re Zimmerman, 4 B.R. 739, 2 C.B.C. 2d 650 (B.C. S.D. Cal. 1980).
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Of course a debtor and a creditor in a Chapter 7 proceeding
are free to negotiate a reaffirmation agreement under section
524(c). This does little good, however, if the value of the collateral
is less than the debt against it. To induce the creditor to agree to
reaffirmation and thereby allow installment payments, the debtor
may be forced to agree to reaffirmation of the entire debt to pre-
serve the option of installment payments. It is also possible that
such a reaffirmation agreement may be disapproved by the court as
not being in the best interest of the debtor under section
524(c) (4) (A) (ii).
By contrast, Chapter 13 authorizes compulsory installment re-
demption of any secured collateral except for a debt secured only
by a security interest in real property used as the debtor's princi-
pal residence. This result is reached through section 1322(b)(2),
which allows a plan to modify the rights of secured creditors, and
section 1325(a)(5)(B), which provides that a plan may be con-
firmed over the objection of a secured claimant if the secured cred-
itor retains a lien, and if the present value of property to be dis-
tributed under the plan is equal to the value of the security.1 35 For
example, if a debtor owned an automobile worth $2,000 which was
security for a debt of $3,000, the debtor could propose to pay the
creditor $2,000 in installments plus interest, which would make the
present value of the installment payments equal to the value of the
collateral, $2,000. The cases setting interest or discount rates for
redemption of secured collateral in Chapter 13 cases have varied
widely. Rates range from the legal rate of interest" 6 to the contract
rate of interest, 7 to the prime rate,188 to rates set arbitrarily at
10189 and 12 percent.40
A Chapter 13 plan may also provide for the curing of any de-
fault and the maintenance of payments while the case is pending
on any debt for which the final payment is due after the conclusion
of the case.1"" A default-curing provision in a plan may apply to a
debt secured solely by real estate that is the debtor's principal resi-
dence, which debt would be otherwise immune from modification
135. Section 1325(a)(5)(B) must be read in conjunction with section 506(a), which sep-
arates an undersecured claim into two components: a secured claim to the value of the col-
lateral and an unsecured claim as to any excess.
136. In re Crockett, 3 B.R. 365 (B.C. N.D. 11. 1980). Currently this rate is six percent
in Montana. MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED § 31-1-106 (1981).
137. In re Smith, 4 B.R. 12, 2 C.B.C. 2d 77 (B.C. E.D. N.Y. 1980).
138. In re Ziegler, 1 C.B.C. 2d 874 (B.C. S.D. Ohio 1980).
139. In re Weaver, 5 B.R. 522, 2 C.B.C. 2d 315 (B.C. N.D. Ga. 1980).
140. In re Meller, 2 C.B.C. 2d 212 (B.C. S.D. Cal. 1980).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
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under section 1322(b)(2). What is a reasonable period of time to
cure a default is to be decided on a case by case basis. The issue
has received little attention in litigation, although it has been held
that six months is a reasonable time to cure a default, 14 2 while
three years is not.1 43
D. Rejection of Executory Contracts and Compulsory
Acceptance of Collateral
Section 1322(b)(7) allows the plan to reject any executory con-
tract or unexpired lease "not previously rejected under section 365
S.. " Rejection of such agreements is a device, often overlooked
under Chapter 13, which permits a debtor to escape a burdensome
contract or lease.
Once an executory contract or lease has been rejected, the
debtor's affirmative obligation of performance is terminated. The
creditor has a claim for damages which is classified as a pre-peti-
tion, usually unsecured, claim. 44 Section 502(7) provides a limita-
tion on damages for termination of a lease on real property. While
there is no express limitation on damages that can be claimed for
termination of a lease on personal property, most financing leases
on personal property calculate payments on the basis of an im-
puted interest rate, or use an interest rate-based premature termi-
nation factor. The debtor or trustee faced with such a claim should
argue that to the extent the lessor's claim for damages is for im-
puted unmatured interest, it should be disallowed under section
502(b)(2).
A Chapter 13 plan may. also provide for compulsory accept-
ance of a portion of collateral by an oversecured creditor in satis-
faction of. that creditor's debt. This is done through the interwork-
ings of sections 1322(b)(2) and (b)(8) which permit a plan to
modify the rights of secured creditors and to pay claims from
property of the estate, and through section 1325(a)(5)(B), which
sets the "cramdown" standard for confirmation of a Chapter 13
plan over the dissent of a secured creditor. The mechanics can best
be shown by example. Suppose a debtor owes a creditor $3,000,
which is secured by a security interest in two motor vehicles, one
worth $3,000 and the other $5,000. The plan could propose that
the $3,000 vehicle be surrendered to the creditor in satisfaction of
the debt. Under section 1325(a)(5)(B), the court could confirm
142. In re Bloess, 5 B.R. 298 (B.C. N.D. Cal. 1980).
143. In re Coleman, 5 B.R. 812, 2 C.B.C. 2d 736 (B.C. W.D. Ky. 1980).
144. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).
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such a plan notwithstanding the wishes of the secured creditor and
it would probably do so, if it found that the value of the collateral
surrendered equaled the amount of the debt.
Counsel for either debtors or creditors faced with compulsory
acceptance of collateral should be aware that under section 506(b),
an oversecured creditor is entitled to post-filing interest, and fees
and costs (such as attorneys' fees) provided for under the agree-
ment under which the claim arose.
E. Business Debtors
One drastic change by the Code expands Chapter 13 to in-
clude persons engaged in business. The expansion is limited to
smaller proprietorships, since Chapter 13 may only be used by "in-
dividuals with regular income" who owe less than $100,000 in un-
secured debts and $350,000 in secured debts that are both noncon-
tingent and liquidated. 1" This plainly excludes partnerships,
corporations and proprietorships with debts greater than those
specified in section 109(e).
For the proprietor who comes within these terms, Chapter 13
offers substantial advantages over a Chapter 11 reorganization,
including:
(1) No creditors' committee is appointed; "
(2) The plan may be substantially simpler than a Chapter 11
plan;'47
(3) No disclosure statement is required;14 8
(4) Acceptance of the plan by unsecured creditors is not re-
quired; 9
(5) Secured creditors can be satisfied by transfer of presently
owned property or by deferred cash payments or a com-
bination;' 50
(6) The debtor is entitled to an expanded discharge on successful
completion of the plan including debts that might be non-dis-
chargeable under Chapter 11.151
These factors in combination result in significant savings in
time and expense in reorganizing a small proprietorship. This is
145. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). The Code is silent about how far debtor may go by pre-peti-
tion transaction, such as dissolution of partnership or corporation, or transferring property
in partial satisfaction of debts to bring the plan within the limits of Chapter 13.
146. 11 U.S.C. § 102. There is no comparable provision under Chapter 13.
147. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1123 with § 1322.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 1125. There is no comparable provision under Chapter .13.
149. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) with § 1328(a)(4).
150. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) with § 1325(a)(5).
151. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1141 with § 1328(a).
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exactly what Congress intended."' Since Chapter 13 can accom-
plish any form of reorganization for an individual that could be
accomplished under Chapter 11, there would be no reason for filing
a Chapter 11 reorganization for a proprietor eligible for relief
under Chapter 13.
IV. CONCLUSION
As this article has noted, Chapter 13 has many areas of poten-
tial abuse. On balance, however, it represents a positive step for-
ward in bankruptcy law. The flexibility it grants obviously benefits
the debtor by releasing the arbitrary restriction of Chapter XIII.
Creditors also benefit to the extent that they are paid more
through Chapter 13 than they would be through liquidation.
In enacting the Code, Congress expressed the belief that most
debtors are basically honest persons experiencing financial misfor-
tune through inadvertance, lured on by the pressures of a con-
sumer credit society.158 Congress concluded that it is unfair to pe-
nalize the honest majority for the abuses of a dishonest minority.
Yet, those potential abuses remain and can only be dealt with
through vigilence by creditors, bankruptcy personnel and the
courts.
152. House Report, supra note 9, at 119.
153. Id. at 116.
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